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
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


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
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*C. S. Young.*

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER.

BY  
H. EDWIN TREMAIN.

CINCINNATI  
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1881.



*In Memoriam.*

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# In Memoriam.

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## MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER.

HOOKER.—At Garden City, N. Y. November 2, 1879, MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER,

No memorial tablet can contain an appropriate record of the life, character, and services of MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER. They deserve a volume. Inscriptions suggest rather than narrate. This sketch must be something less than an inscription.

Some men impress themselves on history through deeds accomplished; others, less fortunate, it may be, in their visible achievements, acquire renown by influence among their contemporaries and on posterity. History accepts the soldier to be great who, in campaigns and battles, was the victorious commander. HOOKER was the leading spirit in battles where he did not command; he was the commander in campaigns history does not yet fully understand and will not accept as victorious.

BUT HOOKER WAS A GREAT SOLDIER. The impress of his genius is stamped on the army in which he was reared and commissioned, and, through that army, on the country whose service was to him the highest duty. It is no detraction from the fame and honor justly due to his contemporaries to say that intrusion is not possible into the niche reserved for him. Living, he enjoyed the admiration of soldiers and of his countrymen; dead, his increasing renown fails to satisfy his surviving friends.

HOOKER's career, however, was not a complicated one. Like his nature, it was frank, open-hearted, and simple. With the exception of a period of about eight years, immediately preceding

the war of the rebellion, years which he spent in private pursuits in California, HOOKER's life was a purely military one.

Born at Hadley, Massachusetts, November 13, 1814, he was graduated at the military academy at West Point in 1837 as number twenty-nine in a class of forty-nine, among whom also were VODGES, BENHAM, WILLIAMS (who fell at Baton Rouge), ADJUTANT-GENERAL TOWNSEND, FRENCH, TODD, BATES, and SEDGWICK, of the Union army, and BRAGG, WM. H. T. WALKER, EARLY, and PEMBERTON, of the rebel army. Commissioned in 1837 as Second Lieutenant in the First Artillery, he passed his first year of service as a subaltern in the Florida war, and the subsequent two years on the northern frontier. On November 3, 1838, HOOKER was promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant. In 1841, he was Adjutant at the military academy, and for the next five years was Adjutant of his regiment. In 1846, at the beginning of the war with Mexico, he was assigned to the staff of BRIGADIER-GENERAL PERSIFER F. SMITH, and afterward transferred to the staff of BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAMAR. In 1847, he was Aid-de-camp to MAJOR-GENERAL BUTLER. He acquired no little popularity and distinction while serving as Assistant Adjutant-General in 1847-48 to MAJOR-GENERAL PILLOW, who was commanding a division. The army record shows that HOOKER, for gallantry at Monterey, was brevetted Captain; at the National Bridge, Major; and for bravery at Chapultepec, Lieutenant-Colonel. HOOKER's services as a staff officer during the Mexican war were notably brilliant and useful. They afforded him an experience and knowledge of men and of campaigns capable of being acquired in no other way; and formed a potent element in educating one of the most unique and conspicuous characters of the war of the rebellion. After Mexico, he served as Assistant Adjutant-General of the Sixth Military Department and of the Pacific Division, in 1849-1851. With his restless and energetic disposition and habits of activity, it is no wonder that, thrown into California at this period, he resigned his commission in the army for private pursuits.

He abandoned agriculture to aid in suppressing the rebellion,

and hastened to Washington when the war broke out. It so happened that his offers of services received little encouragement. He was about to leave the Capital unaccepted, and called, before departing, upon PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

He told the President, on being introduced to him, by mistake, as *Captain HOOKER*, that he had been *Lieutenant-Colonel HOOKER* of the regular army, and that he had come from California to tender his services to the government, but that either his relations to GENERAL SCOTT, or some other impediment, stood in the way of making his military education useful.

"I am about to return," he added; "but before going I was anxious to pay my respects to you, sir, and to express my wish for your personal welfare, and for your success in putting down the rebellion. And, while I am about it, Mr. President, I want to say one thing more, and that is, that I was at the battle of Bull Run, the other day, and it is neither vanity nor boasting in me to declare that I am a better general than you, sir, had on that field."

Of this interview, PRESIDENT LINCOLN is said subsequently to have remarked: "HOOKER's eye was steady and clear; his manner not half so confident as his words; and, altogether, he had the air of a man of sense and intelligence, who would at least try to make his words good. I was impressed with him, and rising out of my chair I walked up to him, and putting my hand on his shoulder, said: *Colonel*—not *Lieutenant-Colonel*—HOOKER, stay, I have use for you and a regiment for you to command."

The *regiment* proved to be a brigade, which he established into a camp near Bladensburg called "Camp Union." His discipline, instruction, and presence quickly turned the volunteer recruit into the ways of a "regular."

HOOKER's commission as Brigadier-General reached him, bearing date May 17, 1861, and, in the autumn of that year, he was placed in charge of the troops occupying the approaches to Washington from the west bank of the Potomac and lower Maryland. His command, at first a brigade of New England regiments, was subsequently enlarged into the famous Second Division, Third

Corps, which, in the spring of 1862, he first brought into line at the siege of Yorktown.

The two divisions of this corps, then commanded by HEINTZLEMAN, became distinguished as the Red Diamond, or First Division, educated and led by the lamented KEARNEY, and the White Diamond, or Second division, commanded by HOOKER. Impetuous, skillful, and self-reliant, these three commanders, in campaign, were more frequently requesting orders to advance, than reporting imaginary resistance. They uniformly sought the enemy.

Thus, although not in the advance, the battle of Williamsburgh (May 5, 1862), following the evacuation of Yorktown, was opened by HOOKER. This was a long sustained and pitched battle. It was begun, continued, directed, and, indeed, finally might have been lost under HOOKER but for the opportune arrival of reinforcements in the afternoon.

"I attacked," said HOOKER, in his testimony, in March, 1863, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "with my single division, a line of works stronger than the line across the peninsula at Yorktown."

A history of the battle of Williamsburgh, and the part taken by GENERAL HOOKER in it, would require more than one chapter.

It was a sanguinary contest. The losses in HOOKER's division were out of all proportion to the casualties of ordinary battle. Of the entire Union loss, 2,228 men, 1,575 were from HOOKER's division, and the balance chiefly from KEARNEY's division, which reinforced him in the afternoon.

Williamsburgh established HOOKER as a leader of men. Its events can not here be described or discussed. A word from HOOKER himself about it might not be out of place. His report says:

"History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night unaided, in the presence of more than thirty thousand of their comrades with arms in their hands. Nevertheless, it is true."

So memorable is the day in the estimation of the Third Corps—which was the only corps continuously engaged on the Union side, that each recurring fifth of May is celebrated by the Annual Re-union of the "*Third Corps Union*," the association of surviving officers of that corps, and, chronologically, the first organization of the various army societies of that character. The last of these reunions held during HOOKER's life (at Delmonico's, New York, May 5, 1879), was attended by him, where, amidst great enthusiasm, HOOKER was called to his feet, and, for the last time, talked in his own fresh and epigrammatic style to the surviving veterans who had followed his fortunes on that eventful day.

HOOKER's commission as Major-General of U. S. Volunteers also dates from this desperate day—May 5, 1862.

When the army had advanced up the Peninsula, and its left was assailed in front of Richmond and driven from its camps, HOOKER, whose troops had been retained in reserve, was brought up, and regained the lost ground in the battles known as Fair Oaks and Seven Pines (June 1).

Then came in succession the battles of Williamsburgh Road, of June 25th, and afterward what is now generally termed the "Seven days' Fight;" HOOKER's division participating in the battles of Glendale and Malvern Hills.

While the army rested at Harrison's Landing, HOOKER led a reconnoissance to Turkey Bend, fighting successfully the second, though light battle of Malvern Hills, with the situation of the opposing forces reversed. This movement, HOOKER maintained, if co-operated in as it developed itself, could have placed the *Army of the Potomac* at Richmond before the enemy in POPE's front could have returned to prevent it. But HOOKER, then a division commander only, was as loyal, obedient, and earnest in supporting his superior commanders, as he was sagacious and fearless in the leadership of his subordinates.

Before the army withdrew from Harrison's Landing, HOOKER urged its commander to march again on Richmond, believing it could be taken. He told GENERAL McCLELLAN, "that if we were

unsuccessful, it would probably cost him his head, but that he might as well die for an old sheep as for a lamb. I told him I knew of no better place to put an army than between JOHNSTON—who was at that time in POPE's front—and the defenses at Richmond."

The Peninsula, however, was abandoned, HOOKER's division of HEINTZELMAN's corps was among the first to report to POPE in the *Army of Virginia*, who immediately thereafter found the enemy between his army and Washington. To HOOKER was assigned the task of restoring communication with the Capital. A timid or vacillating march might have destroyed our army. HOOKER encountered the enemy at Bristoe Station, where ensued (August 27) and was fought a hotly contested but successful engagement. His division again fought intensely at the Second Manassas (August 29), and at Chantilly (September 1), which battle turned LEE's apparently victorious columns from Washington to the upper Potomac.

What more natural than that HOOKER should be needed there? Besides, the remnants of his old division should recruit some strength.

Assigned to the command of the First Corps, he arrived on the field in time to make the battle of South Mountain a success; and was entrusted, two days later, at Antietam, with the responsible duty of leading the right wing in the grand flank movement, which was the scheme of this engagement;—an engagement which, however tenaciously fought, faithfully conducted, and honorable in its results for the Union arms, nevertheless, from the fruitless inactivity which followed it, has degenerated from a decisive historical victory into a bloody combat of civil war—an episode in its military annals.

Both at South Mountain and Antietam, HOOKER was incontestibly a great leader. Wounded painfully in the foot, at the close of the severest fighting in his front, who shall say that, had HOOKER not been carried from the field, greater luster might have fallen to the Union arms? While recovering from this wound,



HOOKEE had no more faithful and sympathizing friend than PRESIDENT LINCOLN, who was his frequent visitor.

In the arrangement, by BURNSIDE, on assuming command of the *Army of the Potomac*, of dividing it into Three Grand Divisions of Two Corps each, HOOKEE was assigned to command the Center Grand Division, composed of the Third Corps, then under STONEMAN, and the Fifth Corps, under BUTTERFIELD. Fredericksburg (December 13) was fought and lost. The post of honor and responsibility, of covering the withdrawal of the Army across the Rappahannock, in presence and under the guns of the enemy, was ably and successfully conducted by HOOKEE's command (the Fifth Corps, under BUTTERFIELD). A second Fredericksburg was attempted but defeated—"The Mud Campaign of Potomac History."

Ineffectual service, resultless combats, heavy losses, drafts, and large expenditures, with political indifference at home, and apparent lack of zeal and confiding faithfulness among officers of rank, shifting of commanders, an unfixed military *régime*, and indeed desertion was telling upon the *morale* and strength of the *Army of the Potomac*. It was in danger of destruction—but not from the enemy. The full private record of these troubles has never been published. History has yet to ascribe adequate reward and proper acknowledgment to the arduous and effective duty performed by the staff and organization that HOOKEE, with his intrinsic knowledge of men, had brought around him. Its silent achievements of detail, discipline, *esprit de corps*, and renewal of patriotism, courage, and faith in that Army, the difficulties encountered, and the results attained in the first sixty days of his command, although thoroughly well-known by all its high officers and good soldiers, have never yet received any sufficient public recognition.

Thus, in camp, as well as amid the strife of actual collision, HOOKEE proved himself a leader among men. He was as sagacious in council and discreet in judgment as he was fearless in the conflict of arms. He made himself, also, generally personally known throughout the Army, and, wherever known, his leadership was acknowledged by every rank.

Every private soldier who wished it visited his own home; every officer was freshly instructed in his special duties; every man was imbued with new military ardor and patriotic zeal; candor, obedience, honor, fidelity, and comradeship were somehow awakened; every soldier saw the President, his Cabinet, and other men of foreign and domestic renown; a personal interest in the success of the war and its conduct was incited; the cavalry was consolidated and organized, as a corps, for the first time, on a basis best adapted for its useful service, and had won its first victory. This organization of the cavalry was followed in other armies. A system of badges and designations for corps, divisions, and brigades was instituted, which fixed responsibility for stragglers and marauding, aided organization, and marvelously increased efficiency and *esprit de corps*. Altogether, from the disintegrating sections in January, the *Army of the Potomac*, at the opening of spring, in 1863, became the choicest command that was ever marshalled under an American soldier. HOOKER never ceased, during his life, to accord to his efficient chief-of-staff, who had labored so thoroughly and effectively in attaining this accomplishment, unstinted praise and commendation.

HOOKER's assignment to the command of this Army had been accompanied by a letter from PRESIDENT LINCOLN, which, though apparently, is not really a reflection upon HOOKER, but rather a tribute to his candor, high-minded patriotism, capacity and good sense. It is, moreover, an evidence of LINCOLN's greatness, and could have had but one author. On these accounts, yet at the risk, in some eyes, of impropriety, it may as well be read here:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 26, 1863.*

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER,

GENERAL:

I have placed you at the head of the *Army of the Potomac*. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons; and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you.

I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during GENERAL BURNSIDE's command of the Army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted \* him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer.

I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those Generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders.

I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you, as far as I can, to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness—beware of rashness; but, with energy and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Having proved himself an organizer, HOOKER's Chancellorsville campaign exhibited him as a strategist and tactician of the first order. His was the fate of war. It is only just to say that, to his death, HOOKER never relinquished the conviction that there was disregard of time, and its consequent fatalities, if not incapacities, in the left wing of his Army, with which HOOKER was not personally present, in this memorable campaign. On the right, where,

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\* In this the President was in error. That some officers high in rank under BURNSIDE are open to this charge is a matter of common history. But, whatever were HOOKER's faults, his opinions, or expressions, he was by instinct and by education too much of a soldier to injure his cause or his commander by inefficient performances or disloyal deeds.

having chosen his position, he forced the enemy to attack him, his presence brought order to a field dismayed by the rout of a panic-stricken corps, and held fresh troops well in hand, next day, for a final blow, to be delivered at the opportune hour. This hour was anxiously awaited, under terrific slaughter; and, when the crisis came, HOOKER was stricken down and carried into the Chancellor House as one bears away the dead. True, he shortly revived, asserted himself, and showed himself among his troops; but appreciating the gravity of all the circumstances and of the results to the country, should that morning's fight bring on disaster, HOOKER confided the immediate disposition of the troops about him to the officer of highest rank near him most available. This was GENERAL MEADE, to whom HOOKER, while helpless, referred a request to continue the battle by attacking, with fresh troops, the exhausted and decimated foe. GENERAL MEADE declined the responsibility of directing attack, on the ground that there was an officer of higher rank with the Army (GENERAL COUCH). Before this officer, in a distant part of the field, arrived, or indeed could be intelligently charged with the situation, the grand opportunity of the day had escaped. The convergence of the Union lines became a necessary consequence, and the two wings of LEE's army united at the ruins of the Chancellorsville mansion.

It is a sad hour for a great army, in the crisis of a great battle, with the country in the balance, at the very acme of victory or defeat, for its commanding General to lie helpless, prostrate from the shock of hostile missile. (This injury, in a few years, brought him paralysis, and afterward, his death.) But this was Chancellorsville, and such was HOOKER's fate. Disabled thus, at the crisis—and how and why it was the crisis, can not be detailed in this place—HOOKER can not strictly be said to be responsible for the impotent conclusions of the encounter so auspiciously begun. Chancellorsville understood is no riddle. The causes which turned it from a Union victory to a Union retreat are not among those which affect the military skill of its commander.

HOOKER's grand physique did not long succumb. Before his

Army had rested in its camps he was on duty, and little was known of his personal escape.

LEE could not surprise HOOKER as HOOKER surprised LEE by his presence at Chancellorsville. Shortly after LEE started for Pennsylvania, HOOKER marched his Army so that he had a shorter route than LEE, either to Washington or to Richmond. Had LEE's Northern move been a feint he would have had to fight HOOKER at the place of the latter's selection. As it was not a feint, HOOKER planned the concentration of the Army at the place of the great Pennsylvania battle. Without the dispositions and marches of troops, as outlined by HOOKER, and executed by his chief-of-staff, Gettysburg would not have been the place of meeting; without the spirit of HOOKER, which pervaded the troops who sought the enemy, and drew him there into premature attack, and fought him so quickly that no battle elsewhere was then possible, who shall say what Gettysburg might have been.

HOOKER was relieved prior to Gettysburg, at his own request. HALLECK had prevented the march of a body of troops at Harper's Ferry, which HOOKER preferred to utilize in the field by abandoning that post, no longer useful. HOOKER had obtained from LINCOLN, on assuming command, the assurance that HALLECK should not interfere with his plans. This interference of HALLECK being regarded, therefore, by HOOKER, as a breach of a necessary condition, he promptly responded by a telegraphic request to be relieved, and GENERAL MEADE the next day assumed the command. A few days afterward Harper's Ferry was abandoned, as HOOKER, in his day had in vain planned.

The morning he relinquished his command at Frederick, a well-known staff officer and friend of GENERAL HOOKER entered his tent to say good-bye, and added that he had hoped to have fought the coming battle under his old commander, of whom he had first learned war. To this HOOKER replied, with moistened eyes, and in his familiar way: "It is all right, — (calling him by name), GENERAL MEADE is a good officer and a brave man, and will command this army well." Then he added the sentiment that, in-

dividuals were of no account in this war—each must do what the country calls him to do.

To another officer he also said, that the country needed every available man to fight the coming great battle, and no individual had a right to stand in the way of the utmost harmony of action. "Myself, and all other Generals in the army," said HOOKER, "had better be sacrificed than that there should be a want of harmony and cordial co-operation on the part of all concerned."

If malice, pique, rivalry, offended dignity, or ill-will had been a present motive it would not have expressed itself thus.

Lofty patriotism, high conception of duty, and the loyal performance of it, conscientiously understood and faithfully sustained by candid effort and fearless execution—this was HOOKER. His march to Pennsylvania was recognized by Congress, in a resolution thanking him for "the skill, energy, and endurance which first covered Washington and Baltimore from the meditated blow of the advancing and powerful army of rebels, led by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE."

To the *Army of the Potomac*, HOOKER's was a genial character. They loved him, trusted him, and received his command without thought or question.

The march to Gettysburg was the carrying out of HOOKER's campaign and ideas by the organization inspired and carried forward by his energies. The same staff HOOKER had selected and advanced guided and posted the troops, provided them with supplies and ammunition, and administered and nerved them. "Every thing was in place as he disposed it; nothing was changed in matter or spirit," is the remark of one who loved and trusted him, "except that in person HOOKER was absent, while still present in spirit and inspiration;—everywhere, from Oak Ridge to Round Top, from the Granite Spur to Culp's Hill."

No one man is the hero of Gettysburg. Every soldier present is a sharer in that honor. HOOKER was not present, but he helped to win it. Let HOOKER, then, share that honor also.

The influence of HOOKER never left the *Army of the Potomac*

until it was mustered out of service under the shadow of the Capitol.

It is rare that an army commander, thus retired into obscurity in the height of hostilities, should respond with alacrity when subsequently called by his government for service in a subordinate position. It was HOOKER's high nature to serve his country wherever it should require his services. In the stress of the *Army of the Cumberland*, at Chattanooga, it was necessary that ROSECRANS should be succored, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were selected to be dispatched from the *Army of the Potomac* for that purpose. Officers of high rank and acknowledged leadership were essential to the movement. Not only was this body of men to be promptly transferred from the fields of Virginia to the capital of Tennessee, but they were to open up a long line of communications through a country threatened by equally powerful forces of the enemy. Celerity, discretion, boldness, and the highest military sagacity were required for successful co-operation with the besieged and starving army under ROSECRANS.

This was accomplished under HOOKER's command. How and by what means and the details of an experience which forms in itself a separate campaign, must be left to the historian. They can not be recited here. The swift movement by rail of this large body of troops from the banks of the Potomac to the Tennessee was one of the marvelous accomplishments of modern war. The details of this movement were entirely in the hands of COLONEL and QUARTERMASTER THOMAS A. SCOTT, afterwards President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and GENERAL BUTTERFIELD, HOOKER's efficient chief-of-staff.

The battle of Wauhatchie, where the choicest corps of the enemy precipitated itself, in a night attack, upon HOOKER's columns, wearied and exhausted by the day's marching and skirmishing, and the dispersement by the assailed command in a general engagement of an enemy which sought its destruction in order to close in upon the last defile by which ROSECRANS' *Army of the Cumber-*



land could be circuitously approached, added renown to a trusted, but hitherto unfortunate commander.

Under less skillful leadership, a failure of this movement, delay in delivering any battle or skirmish during the march from Nashville to Chattanooga, or default in accomplishing its plan, might have been unfortunate and disastrous in its results to the *Army of the Cumberland* and to the country. The Chattanooga of 1863 might have been the Valley Forge of 1778.

On the reorganization of the *Army of the Cumberland*, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated, and with other troops formed the Twentieth Corps, to which HOOKER was formally assigned.

That THOMAS and not HOOKER was assigned to the command of the *Army of the Cumberland* might have been a source of discomfort to some men. It was not to HOOKER. He received and obeyed his orders with his usual spirit of loyalty to his superior officers.

Then came the battles of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, in the plan of which HOOKER again was assigned a subordinate part. His was the duty of "demonstrating" against the impregnable Lookout Mountain, while the grand effort should be made by SHERMAN on the left to carry Mission Ridge.

All of HOOKER's command, except one division (under GEARY) had been withdrawn from him to participate in the forthcoming battle.

HOOKER felt his isolation and apparent uselessness in this situation, and eager to participate in the general engagement about to occur, applied for permission to join the largest part of his command, which had been detached from his immediate supervision to participate in the assault. This request was refused. While the troops were passing through HOOKER's camp to engage in the assault, the bridge they were using to cross the river broke and became useless. In this emergency, it was decided that in case the troops could not get over HOOKER should assume command of all unable to cross. It was expected that OSTERHAUS' division of the *Army of the Tennessee* and CRUFT's division of the *Army of the*

*Cumberland* would have been able to have crossed the pontoon bridge and join the assaulting columns in front of Chattanooga. Indeed, the attack was deferred for that purpose.

It was under these circumstances that HOOKER was directed to take these two divisions and his own and make a demonstration on Lookout Mountain, provided the bridge could not be repaired in time to cross for the assault as contemplated. This order reached HOOKER about six o'clock in the evening before the battle. It proved impossible to restore the bridge in season: so between sunset and sunrise HOOKER's plans were formed, troops disposed, and every thing made ready for the "demonstration" he was ordered to institute against Lookout.

It was not expected that the troops thus under HOOKER's command should be able to accomplish anything more than to divert the enemy in favor of the grand assault upon his right. HOOKER's tent, however, had been facing that grand old mountain not in vain. Its occupant had not been idle. He had studied the ground, the enemy's forces, defenses, and their approaches; and when, at last, the opportunity to participate in the grand attack of the *Army of the Cumberland* was not to come to him, but instead thereof came orders that he should make a *demonstration*, a plan was quickly formed by him that contemplated *carrying* the mountain. How a force was swiftly moved around its base, and across its brow, under cover of the morning mists, and a heavy fire in front—is a story often told in prose, in verse, in household words, and pictured in enduring art for the admiration of generations to come.

When at last the sun broke through the mists on the mountain sides, it was no figure of words that led a distinguished officer to report that HOOKER's colors were "above the clouds." His troops were on the summit of Lookout Mountain. At this, none, it is likely, were more surprised than the great commanders to whom HOOKER's signals reported his success. It was after this, that beyond on the left, across the valley, the impetuous soldiers of SHERMAN and THOMAS drove the enemy from Mission Ridge, and the *Army of the Cumberland* avenged Chickamauga.

Next came the campaign of 1864, from Chattanooga to Dalton, Resaca, and on to Atlanta. From May 2d to July 30th it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there was almost continuous fighting. Millcreek Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cassville, Dallas, Pine Mountain, skirmishes on the Chattahoochie, and bloody collisions almost daily, brought the army near Atlanta. At Resaca and Peach Tree Creek the inevitable result of HOOKER's actual personal leadership, when in contact with the enemy, was felt throughout the field.

At Snake Creek Gap, before the battle of Resaca opened, the Twentieth Corps, obedient to orders, was restrained from the attack, which HOOKER would have precipitated twelve hours before the battle did actually begin. To the Twentieth Corps was afterward assigned the task of carrying the two redoubts which were to be stormed.

The exploits of this attack, conducted under HOOKER's personal direction, will ever shine with luster in the annals of the *Army of the Cumberland*.

Before he left that army, HOOKER's friends were all who knew him. HOOKER's leadership, as one of its honored generals, was universally acknowledged. Why, at last, he asked to be relieved from duty in it will never be imputed to a desire to quit its service. It was the result of an honest conviction of an honest mind. HOOKER deliberately concluded that it was not intended in all quarters that he should be fairly treated. He was willing, he thought, to overlook many intentional offenses; but when the gallant and unfortunate McPHERSON fell, what more natural for HOOKER to expect than that his rank, subordination, services, and success should entitle him to be named as McPHERSON's successor. Whether, in this respect, HOOKER was right, need not be discussed here. Let it be debated by men who think they would have acted otherwise. Suffice it to narrate, that GENERAL HOWARD (who had commanded the panic-stricken corps\* in HOOKER's army at Chancel-

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\*The extreme foresight and carefulness of HOOKER, in all his official acts, can not be more aptly illustrated than by his reply when, after Chancellorsville, it

lorsville) was placed in command of the *Army of the Tennessee*, subject to the approval of the President. LINCOLN telegraphed SHERMAN to appoint HOOKER. SHERMAN reiterated his desire to have HOWARD appointed. The President still urged HOOKER's appointment; whereupon SHERMAN made his resignation a condition of GENERAL HOOKER's appointment. HOWARD was appointed, and HOOKER, at his own request, was then relieved from command of the Twentieth Corps. This is the statement which has been given upon high authority.

Who shall say that HOOKER was then unwise? Critics may condemn, but generations will continue to admire.

HOOKER was assigned to the command of the Northern Department, with headquarters established at Detroit, and held no other command during the hostilities.

On October 3, 1865, he was married to Miss OLIVIA AUGUSTA GROESBECK, of Cincinnati, who died in Watertown, July 15, 1868.

HOOKER had previously met with a paralytic stroke, resulting from his Chancellorsville injury, and was for a long time an invalid. He subsequently recovered sufficiently to go about with the

was urged upon him, by officers high in rank, to distribute the troops which on his right at Chancellorsville had so carelessly performed its duty as to allow the enemy to march within its lines without firing a shot. He was urged to send a regiment from that corps to each brigade in the balance of the army, and to send its generals and staff to Washington for duty in other fields (as had quietly been done with some other officers some weeks before). HOOKER's magnanimous reply was, that the corps was composed of a foreign and patriotic element, and such action on his part would be misconstrued into an intentional affront to that element in the army. Besides, it would place a political hornet's nest about PRESIDENT LINCOLN which might seriously interfere with his administration and with the line of policy it was pursuing. It is natural that a man who had commanded an army should look with disfavor upon the promotion of one of his subordinate corps commanders to the command of an army, while the army commander should be relegated to the head of a corps. With relations existing under these circumstances between HOWARD and HOOKER, and the well known disfavor with which HOOKER was personally regarded in some high quarters, is it strange that at this juncture he wished to be relieved?

aid of a servant, but he never regained the great physical strength and health which, if not his boast, was universally attributed to him. Until the very last years of his life, he retained the same freshness of complexion and youthful expression which marked his personal appearance. Tall, well-proportioned, dignified, commanding in demeanor, graceful in action, firm of step, of engaging manner, affectionate in disposition, and with a frank, terse, and epigrammatic style of conversation, HOOKER was one of the most accomplished gentlemen and imposing soldiers who ever wore the uniform of the American army.

He died at Garden City, November 2, 1879, at the age of sixty-four years.

The obsequies took place in New York city, and were notable for the large number of officers of all ranks and arms of the service who were present, eager to pay tribute to an honored and esteemed leader. The remains were placed in state in City Hall, where they were attended by a guard from the regular army, and a guard of honor, furnished by the surviving officers of the Third Army Corps, with which HOOKER's first services in the last war commenced. Attended by an escort from the regular army, suitable to his rank, the Seventh Regiment New York State Militia, a large number of veteran officers, who followed the hearse on foot, the remains were removed at mid-day, through respectful and reverent crowds of the populace, up Broadway to the Madison Square Presbyterian Church, where impressive funeral services were held in the presence of a crowded congregation of distinguished citizens, and REV. DR. ADAMS delivered a brief but eloquent and appropriate address. Accompanied by a guard of honor from the regular army, and a deputation from the *Army of the Cumberland*, the remains were then transferred to Cincinnati, where the interment took place. Subsequently an immense meeting was held, at Music Hall in Boston, under the auspices of HOOKER's old brigade, which was attended not only by the veterans who had served under him, but by an immense company of soldiers, veteran organizations, prominent men, and citizens generally. A fitting and appropriate

eulogy was pronounced by REV. DR. WARREN H. CUDWORTH, of Boston, who had served under HOOKER as chaplain. Other meetings were held by veterans in various parts of the country. At the ensuing annual meetings of the Third Army Corps Union, *The Society of the Army of the Potomac*, and *The Society of the Army of the Cumberland*, appropriate resolutions of affectionate respect and condolence were adopted.

Public estimates of HOOKER's character, it is true, have greatly differed. He has been condemned and praised by military critics. Generally, those who have condemned have been without adequate knowledge to warrant sentence of condemnation. Generally, those who have praised have been those who best knew and understood his career. Allowance, too, must be made of the different attitudes from which his critics looked upon this man. He undoubtedly had his defects in the strategy of war. It is, however, more of a task to detail them with great effort, than to point to his accomplishments in his profession. His bearing and bravery; his leadership of men in battle, if it ever ceases to be history, will still repose as a tradition as long as there is an American army. He was instinctively a general, and wherever he was upon the line of battle, he was instinctively a leader.


It was impossible for him to remain at the rear in action cool and indifferent to the immediate contest, and caring only for the general result; he was always at the front to see with his own eyes the movements of his troops and of all other troops dependent on them.

However public estimates may differ, the personal friends of GENERAL HOOKER never differed in honoring him with a quick, ardent, and fiery nature—faithful in friendship, but not bitter in hates; always generous; ever ambitious, and constantly a sharp critic of his fellow generals—not because of a vain and captious disposition, but in the true spirit of patriotic urgency in the service to which he belonged. "I have never fought without good purpose," HOOKER said on one occasion. "When I have decided to fight, I have done so with all the vigor and strength I

could command." The name of "Fighting Joe Hooker" is not a comprehensive description of the man, his traits, or his capacities. It was rather a popular but deserved tribute to a restless nature, serving under orders to antagonize the enemy. His sterling courage, his constant presence under fire, his magnificent personal bearing in the height of his physical strength, his unfailing courtesy to those under him, his genial kindliness to the plainest soldier, will never be forgotten by those who served with him.


GENERAL HOOKER loved the *Army of the Cumberland*. He admired and respected that great patriot and soldier, GEORGE H. THOMAS, its commander while HOOKER served with it. He placed THOMAS pre-eminent among the soldiers and Generals of the Union. He not only supported him with all his strength, but regarded him with the personal affection common to his army and to the country. In turn, too, it may be said, with truth, that the *Army of the Cumberland* loved and respected JOSEPH HOOKER, and will ever revere and praise his memory.


















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